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Abstract—Kalman filters and observers are two main classes of
dynamic state estimation (DSE) routines. Power system DSE has
been implemented by various Kalman filters, such as the extended
Kalman filter (EKF) and the unscented Kalman filter (UKF). In
this paper, we discuss two challenges for an effective power system
DSE: (a) model uncertainty and (b) potential cyber attacks. To
address this, the cubature Kalman filter (CKF) and a nonlinear
observer are introduced and implemented. Various Kalman filters
and the observer are then tested on the 16-machine, 68-bus system
given realistic scenarios under model uncertainty and different
types of cyber attacks against synchrophasor measurements. It
is shown that CKF and the observer are more robust to model
uncertainty and cyber attacks than their counterparts. Based on
the tests, a thorough qualitative comparison is also performed
for Kalman filter routines and observers.
Index Terms—Cyber attack, dynamic state estimation, Kalman
filter, model uncertainty, non-Gaussian noise, observer, phasor
measurement unit (PMU).
I. INTRODUCTION
STATE estimation is a crucial application in the energymanagement system (EMS). The well-known static state
estimation (SSE) methods [1]–[4] assume that the power
system is operating in quasi-steady state, based on which the
static states—the voltage magnitude and phase angles of the
buses—are estimated by using SCADA and/or synchrophasor
measurements. SSE is critical for power system monitoring
as it provides inputs for other EMS applications such as
automatic generation control and optimal power flow.
However, SSE may not be sufficient for desirable situational
awareness as the system states evolve more rapidly due to an
increasing penetration of renewable generation and distributed
energy resources. Therefore, dynamic state estimation (DSE)
processes estimating the dynamic states (i.e., the internal states
of generators) by using highly synchronized PMU measure-
ments with high sampling rates will be critical for the wide-
area monitoring, protection, and control of power systems.
For both SSE and DSE, two significant challenges make
their practical application significantly difficult. First, the
system model and parameters used for estimation can be
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inaccurate, which is often called model uncertainty [5], con-
sequently deteriorating estimation in some scenarios. Second,
the measurements used for estimation are vulnerable to cyber
attacks, which in turn leads to compromised measurements
that can greatly mislead the estimation.
For the first challenge, there are recent efforts on validat-
ing the dynamic model of the generator and calibrating its
parameters [6], [7], which DSE can be based on. However,
model validation itself can be very challenging. Hence, it is
a more viable solution to improve the estimators by making
them more robust to the model uncertainty.
For the second challenge, false data injection attacks against
SSE are proposed in [8]. After that it has been widely studied
about how to mitigate this type of attack and further secure
the monitoring and control of power grids [9]–[11].
As for the approaches for performing DSE, there are mainly
two classes of methods that have been proposed:
1) Stochastic Estimators: given a discrete-time representa-
tion of a dynamical system, the observed measurements,
and the statistical information on process noise and
measurement noise, Kalman filter (KF) and its many
derivatives have been proposed that calculate the Kalman
gain as a function of the relative certainty of the current
state estimate and the measurements [12]–[16].
2) Deterministic Observers: given a continuous- or
discrete-time dynamical system depicted by state-space
matrices, a combination of matrix equalities and in-
equalities are solved, while guaranteeing asymptotic
(or bounded) estimation error. The solution to these
equations is often matrices that are used in an observer to
estimate states and other dynamic quantities [17]–[19].
For power systems, DSE has been implemented by several
stochastic estimators, such as extended Kalman filter (EKF)
[20], [21], unscented Kalman filter (UKF) [22]–[26], square-
root unscented Kalman filter (SR-UKF) [27]–[29], extended
particle filter [30], [31], and ensemble Kalman filter [32].
While these techniques produce good estimation under nom-
inal conditions, most of them lack the ability to deal with
significant model uncertainty and malicious cyber attacks.
In order to improve the robustness of KFs, a generalized
maximum-likelihood-type estimate is proposed in [33] and
a two-stage KF is proposed in [34]. Besides, iterated EKF
[35], H∞ EKF [36], and robust UKF [37] are have also been
developed for power system DSE.
The goal of this paper is to present alternatives that address
these limitations. The contributions are summarized as follows.
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2First, we design a nonlinear observer for the power system
DSE problem that only requires computing a Luenberger-like
gain matrix. This computation can be performed offline—and
hence the presented observer is scalable for large-scale power
networks. The designed observer requires obtaining scalar
parameters that depict or bound the nonlinearities arising from
the power system model. Numerical algorithms are provided
to find these scalar parameters, in comparison with the ob-
server design literature that obtains these scalars analytically
which is impractical for large-scale power networks with
high nonlinearities. The observer is endowed with the the
following properties and virtues: (a) It considers a nonlinear
measurement model, in comparison with other methods that
utilize linearized measurement models; (b) assumes that the
generators’ control inputs are not known to the state esti-
mation method; (c) tolerates three classes of cyber-attacks
(data integrity, denial of service, and replay attack) and other
disturbances while accurately reconstructing the power system
state within seconds of an attack or large disturbance; (d)
assumes no statistical properties of the noise targeting process
and measurement models; (e) requires no major real-time
computation, in comparison with other estimation methods
that are computationally expensive. To our knowledge, this
contribution is the first of its kind in the power system DSE
literature in comparison with Kalman filter derivatives.
Second, we introduce cubature Kalman filter (CKF) [16]
that uses a more accurate cubature approach and possesses
an important virtue of mathematical rigor rooted in the third-
degree spherical-radial cubature rule for numerically comput-
ing Gaussian-weighted integrals. Without a stem at the center
in the cubature-point set, CKF does not have the numerical
instability problem of UKF [16], [29].
Last but not least, we design a realistic power system DSE
problem by developing the system and measurement models
and considering various practical scenarios such as unknown
initial conditions, model uncertainties including process noise,
unknown and unavailable inputs, and inaccurate parameters,
and different types of measurement noises and cyber at-
tacks against measurements. We present thorough numerical
experiments to showcase the performance of the nonlinear
observer and CKF in comparison with three other methods that
have been recently applied to DSE. The conceptual strengths
and limitations of different methods with significant model
uncertainty and cyber attacks are also discussed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
physical depictions of the model uncertainty and attack-threat
model are introduced in Section III. The CKF and the non-
linear observer are introduced in Sections IV and V. Then,
numerical results are given in Section VI. Finally, insightful re-
marks and conclusions are presented in Sections VII and VIII.
II. NONLINEAR MULTI-MACHINE POWER SYSTEM MODEL
Here we briefly discuss the power system model used for
DSE. Each of the G generators is described by the fourth-order
transient model in local d− q reference frame:
δ˙i = ωi − ω0
ω˙i =
ω0
2Hi
(
Tmi − Tei − KDiω0 (ωi − ω0)
)
e˙′qi =
1
T ′d0i
(
Efdi − e′qi − (xdi − x′di)idi
)
e˙′di =
1
T ′q0i
(
− e′di + (xqi − x′qi)iqi
)
,
(1)
where i is the generator serial number, δi is the rotor angle,
ωi is the rotor speed in rad/s, and e′qi and e
′
di are the transient
voltage along q and d axes; iqi and idi are stator currents
at q and d axes; Tmi is the mechanical torque, Tei is the
electric air-gap torque, and Efdi is the internal field voltage;
ω0 is the rated value of angular frequency, Hi is the inertia
constant, and KDi is the damping factor; T ′q0i and T
′
d0i are the
open-circuit time constants for q and d axes; xqi and xdi are
the synchronous reactance and x′qi and x
′
di are the transient
reactance respectively at the q and d axes.
The Tmi and Efdi in (1) are considered as inputs. The set
of generators where PMUs are installed is denoted by GP. For
generator i ∈ GP, the terminal voltage phaosr Eti = eRi+jeIi
and current phasor Iti = iRi + jiIi can be measured and are
used as the outputs. Correspondingly, the state vector x ∈ Rn,
input vector u ∈ Rv , and output vector y ∈ Rp are
x =
[
δ> ω> e′q
>
e′d
>]> (2a)
u =
[
Tm
> Efd>
]>
(2b)
y =
[
eR
> eI> iR> iI>
]>
. (2c)
The Tei, idi, and iqi can be written as functions of x:
ΨRi = e
′
di sin δi + e
′
qi cos δi (3a)
ΨIi = e
′
qi sin δi − e′di cos δi (3b)
Iti = Y i(ΨR + jΨI) (3c)
iRi = Re(Iti) (3d)
iIi = Im(Iti) (3e)
iqi =
SB
SNi
(iIi sin δi + iRi cos δi) (3f)
idi =
SB
SNi
(iRi sin δi − iIi cos δi) (3g)
eqi = e
′
qi − x′diidi (3h)
edi = e
′
di + x
′
qiiqi (3i)
Tei =
SB
SNi
(eqiiqi + ediidi), (3j)
where Ψi = ΨRi+ jΨIi is the voltage source, ΨR and ΨI are
column vectors of all generators’ ΨRi and ΨIi, eqi and edi are
the terminal voltage at q and d axes, Y i is the ith row of the
admittance matrix of the reduced network Y , and SB and SNi
are the system base MVA and the base MVA for generator i,
respectively.
In (3), the outputs iRi and iIi have been written as functions
of x. Similarly, the outputs eRi and eIi can also be written as
function of x:
eRi = edi sin δi + eqi cos δi (4a)
eIi = eqi sin δi − edi cos δi. (4b)
The dynamic model (1) can then be rewritten in a general
3state space form as{
x˙ = Ax+Bu+ φ(x)
y = h(x),
(5)
where
A =

IG(−KD2H)d (− 1G  T ′d0)d (− 1G  T ′q0)d

,
B =

(
ω01G  2H
)d
(
1G  T ′d0
)d

,
φ =

−ω01G(
ω01G  2H
)
~
(− T e +KD1G)(
1G  T ′d0
)
~
(− (xd − x′d)id)(
1G  T ′q0
)
~
(
(xq − x′q)iq
)
 ,
and h include functions (3d)–(3e) and (4) for all generators,
 and ~ are the Hadamard division/product (elementwise
division/product) of a vector, and (a)d gets a square diagonal
matrix with the elements of vector a on the main diagonal.
Note that the model presented here is used for DSE for
which the real-time inputs are assumed to be unavailable and
Tmi and Efdi only take steady-state values, mainly because
these inputs are difficult to measure [21], [25]. However,
when we simulate the power system to mimic the real system
dynamics, we model an IEEE Type DC1 excitation system and
a simplified turbine-governor system for each generator and
thus Tmi and Efdi change with time due to the governor and
the excitation control, which leads to a tenth order generator
model. More details about the model can be found in [38].
We do not directly use a detailed model including the exciter
and governor as in [31] for the DSE mainly because 1) A good
model should be simple enough to facilitate design [5], 2) it
is harder to validate a detailed model and there are also more
parameters that need to be calibrated [6], [7], [39], and 3) the
computational burden can be higher for a more detailed model,
which may not satisfy the requirement of real-time estimation.
III. MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND CYBER ATTACKS
The dynamic model of the power system can be written in
a general state space form as{
x = f(x,u) (6a)
y = h(x,u), (6b)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rv , and y ∈ Rp are the vectors of the
state, input, and output, and f and h are the nonlinear state
transition functions and measurement functions. We rewrite
(6) by separating the nonlinear term in the state transition
functions as {
x˙ = Ax + Bu + φ(x) (7a)
y = h(x,u), (7b)
where φ(x) represents the nonlinear term that models the
interconnections in a multi-machine power system.
Two great challenges for an effective DSE are the model
uncertainty and potential cyber attacks—discussed next.
A. Model Uncertainty
The term model uncertainty refers to the differences or
errors between models and reality. Various control and esti-
mation theory studies investigated methods that addresses the
discrepancy between the actual physics and models. The model
uncertainty can be caused by the following reasons.
1) Unknown inputs: The unknown inputs against the system
dynamics include ud (representing the unknown plant
disturbances), uu (denoting the unknown control inputs),
and fa (depicting potential generators actuator faults).
For simplicity, we can combine them into one unknown
input quantity w =
[
u>d u
>
u f
>
a
]>
. Defining Bw to be
the known weight distribution matrix of the distribution
of unknown inputs with respect to each state-equation.
The term Bww models a general class of unknown
inputs such as: nonlinearities, modeling uncertainties,
noise, parameter variations, unmeasurable system inputs,
model reduction errors, and actuator faults [40], [41].
The process dynamics under unknown inputs can be
written as follows:
x˙ = Ax + Bu + Bww + φ(x). (8)
2) Unavailable inputs: Real-time inputs u can be unavail-
able, in which case the steady-states inputs u0 are used
for estimation.
3) Parameter inaccuracy: The parameters in the system
model can be inaccurate. For example, the reduced
admittance matrix can be inaccurate when a fault or the
following topology change are not detected.
B. Cyber Attacks
The National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization
Resource (NESCOR) developed cyber-security failure scenar-
ios with corresponding impact analyses [42]. The WAMPAC
failure scenarios motivate the research in this paper include:
a) Measurement Data (from PMUs) Compromised due to PDC
Authentication Compromise and b) Communications Compro-
mised between PMUs and Control Center [42]. Specifically,
we consider the following three types of attacks [42], [43].
1) Data integrity attacks: An adversary attempts to corrupt
the content of either the measurement or the control
signals. A specific example of data integrity attacks
are Man-in-the-Middle attacks, where the adversary
intercepts the measurement signals and modifies them
in transit. For DSE the PMU measurements can be
modified and corrupted.
2) Denial of Service (DoS) attack: An attacker attempts to
introduce a denial in communication of measurement.
4The communication of a sensor could be jammed by
flooding the network with spurious packets. For DSE
the consequence can be that the updated measurements
cannot be sent to the control center.
3) Replay attacks: A special case of data integrity attacks,
where the attacker replays a previous snapshot of a valid
communication packet sequence that contains measure-
ments in order to deceive the system. For DSE the PMU
measurements can be changed to be those in the past.
Apart from the above-mentioned cyber attacks against the
PMU measurement, the commonly assumed Gaussian distribu-
tion of the PMU measurement noise may not hold for real data.
Extensive results using field PMU data from WECC system
has revealed that the Gaussian assumption is questionable [44].
Therefore, it would be valuable to evaluate the performance
of different DSE methods under non-Gaussian noise.
IV. KALMAN FILTERS FOR POWER SYSTEM DSE
Unlike many estimation methods that are either computa-
tionally unmanageable or require special assumptions about
the form of the process and observation models, KF only
utilizes the first two moments of the state (mean and co-
variance) in its update rule [12]. It consists of two steps: in
prediction step, the filter propagates the estimate from last
time step to current time step; in update step, the filter updates
the estimate using collected measurements. KF was initially
developed for linear systems while for power system DSE the
system equations and outputs have strong nonlinearity. Thus
variants of KF that can deal with nonlinear systems have been
introduced, such as EKF and UKF.
A. Extended Kalman Filter
Although EKF maintains the elegant and computationally
efficient recursive update form of KF, it works well only in
a ‘mild’ nonlinear environment, owing it to the first-order
Taylor series approximation for nonlinear functions [16]. It
is sub-optimal and can easily lead to divergence. Also, the
linearization can be applied only if the Jacobian matrix exists
and calculating Jacobian matrices can be difficult and error-
prone. For DSE, EKF has been discussed in [20], [21].
B. Unscented Kalman Filter
The unscented transformation (UT) [45] is developed to
address the deficiencies of linearization by providing a more
direct and explicit mechanism for transforming mean and
covariance information. Based on UT, Julier et al. [14], [15]
propose the UKF as a derivative-free alternative to EKF. The
Gaussian distribution is represented by a set of deterministi-
cally chosen sample points called sigma points. The UKF has
been applied to power system DSE, for which no linearization
or calculation of Jacobian matrices is needed [22]–[26].
In UKF, a total of 2n+ 1 sigma points (denoted by X ) are
calculated from the columns of the matrix η
√
P as
X (0) = m (9a)
X (i) = m+
[
η
√
P
]
i
, i = 1, . . . , n (9b)
X (i) = m−
[
η
√
P
]
i
, i = n+ 1, . . . , 2n (9c)
with weights
w(0)m =
λ
n+ λ
(10a)
w(0)c =
λ
n+ λ
+ (1− α2 + β) (10b)
w(i)m =
1
2(n+ λ)
, i = 1, . . . , 2n (10c)
w(i)c =
1
2(n+ λ)
, i = 1, . . . , 2n, (10d)
where the matrix square root of a positive semidefinite matrix
P is a matrix S =
√
P such that P = SS>, wm and wc
are respectively weights for the mean and the covariance, η =√
n+ λ, λ is a scaling parameter defined as λ = α2(n+κ)−n,
and α, β, and κ are constants and α and β are nonnegative.
The basic idea of UKF is to choose the sigma-point set to
capture a number of low-order moments of the prior density
of the states as correctly as possible, and then compute the
posterior statistics of the nonlinear functions (either state tran-
sition functions f or measurement functions h) by UT which
approximates the mean and the covariance of the nonlinear
function by a weighted sum of projected sigma points.
However, for the sigma-points, the stem at the center (the
mean) is highly significant as it carries more weight which is
usually negative for high-dimensional systems. Therefore, the
UKF is supposed to encounter numerical instability troubles
when used in high-dimensional problems. Several techniques
including the square-root unscented Kalman filter (SR-UKF)
have been proposed to solve this problem [27], [28]. Recently
SR-UKF has been applied to DSE in power systems in [29].
C. Cubature Kalman Filter
EKF and UKF can suffer from the curse of dimensionality
while becoming detrimental in high-dimensional state-space
models of size twenty or more—especially when there are
high degree of nonlinearities in the equations that describe
the state-space model [16], [46], which is exactly the case for
power systems. Making use of the spherical-radial cubature
rule, Arasaratnam et al. [16] propose CKF, which possesses
an important virtue of mathematical rigor rooted in the third-
degree spherical-radial cubature rule for numerically comput-
ing Gaussian-weighted integrals. In this paper we will apply
CKF to power system DSE. Compared with EKF, UKF, and
SR-UKF, CKF has the following advantages:
1) Compared with EKF and similar to UKF and SR-UKF,
CKF is also derivative-free and is easier for application.
2) Similar to UKF and SR-UKF, CKF also uses a weighted
set of symmetric points to approximate the Gaussian
distribution. But the cubature-point set does not have a
stem at the center and thus does not have the numerical
instability problem of UKF discussed in Section IV-B.
53) UKF treats the derivation of the sigma-point set for the
prior density and the computation fo posterior statistics
as two disjoint problems. By contrast, CKF directly
derives the cubature-point set to accurately compute the
first two-order moments of a nonlinear transformation,
therefore naturally increasing the accuracy of the numer-
ical estimates for moment integrals [16].
4) As suboptimal Bayesian filters, EKF, UKF, and CKF
all have some robustness to model uncertainties and
measurement outliers [47]. The extent of robustness
depends on their ability to accurately deal with the
nonlinear transformations. The EKF is the least robust
method due to a first-order Taylor series approxima-
tion of the nonlinear functions while the CKF has the
highest robustness thanks to its more accurate cubature
approach, which will be validated in the result section.
V. NONLINEAR OBSERVERS FOR POWER SYSTEM DSE
Dynamic observers have been thoroughly investigated for
different classes of systems. To mention a few, they have been
developed for linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, nonlinear
time-invariant (NLTI) systems, LTI and NLTI systems with
unknown inputs, sensor and actuator faults, stochastic dynam-
ical systems, and hybrid systems [17], [18].
Most observers utilize the plant’s outputs and inputs to
generate real-time estimates of the plant states, unknown
inputs, and sensor faults. The cornerstone is the innovation
function—sometimes a simple gain matrix designed to nullify
the effect of unknown inputs and faults. Linear and nonlinear
functional observers, sliding-mode observers, unknown input
observers, and observers for fault detection and isolation are
all examples on developed observers for different classes of
systems, under different assumptions [19].
In comparison with KF techniques, nonlinear and robust
observers have not been utilized for power system DSE.
However, they inherently possess the theoretical, technical,
and computational capabilities to perform good estimation of
the power system’s dynamic states. As for implementation,
observers are simpler than KFs. For observers, matrix gains
are computed offline to guarantee the asymptotic stability of
the estimation error or the boundedness of the estimation error
within a neighborhood of the origin.
Here, we present a recently developed observer in [48]
that can be applied for DSE in power systems. This observer
assumes that the nonlinear function φ(x) in (7) satisfies the
one-sided Lipschitz condition. Specifically, there exists ρ ∈ R
such that ∀x1,x2 in a region D including the origin with
respect to the state x, there is
〈φ(x1)− φ(x2),x1 − x2〉 ≤ ρ ‖x1 − x2‖2,
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product. Besides, the nonlinear func-
tion is also assumed to be quadratically inner-bounded as(
φ(x1)− φ(x2)
)>(
φ(x1)− φ(x2)
) ≤ µ ‖x1 − x2‖2
+ϕ 〈φ(x1)− φ(x2),x1 − x2〉,
where µ and ϕ are real numbers. Similar results related to the
dynamics of multi-machine power systems established a simi-
Algorithm 1 Obtaining One-Sided Lipschitz Constant ρ
input φ(x) and D
ρ0 ← −∞
for i = 1 : nD do
x← xi
compute ρi =
[
λmax
(
1
2
(
∂φ(x)
∂x
+
(
∂φ(x)
∂x
)>))]
ρi = max(ρi−1, ρi)
end for
output ρ← ρnD
lar quadratic bound on the nonlinear component (see [49]). To
determine the constants ρ, µ, andϕ, a simple offline algorithm
can be implemented. For example, we can define a region of
interest D ⊂ Rn to be the state-space region where the system
operates. For the multi-machine power network, this region is
the intersection of all upper and lower bounds of states, which
can be written as
D = [xmin1 ,xmax1 ]× [xmin2 ,xmax2 ]× · · · × [xminn ,xmaxn ].
This D can be obtained by the method discussed in [50].
We sample random points in this region. Denser sampling
yields a more realistic Lipschitz constant, while requiring more
computational time. Let nD be the total number of samples
inside D. Algorithm 1 includes the steps required to obtain ρ.
Specifically, ρ can be calculated from
ρ = lim sup
(
β
(∂φ
∂x
))
for all x ∈ D, where β(H) denotes the logarithmic matrix
norm of matrix H defined as
β(H) = lim
→0
‖I + H‖ − 1

,
where ‖ · ‖ represents any matrix norm. It is shown in [51]
that the logarithmic matrix norm can also be written as
β(H) = λmax
(
1
2
(
H + H>
))
≤ ‖H‖.
At each iteration, we obtain the maximum eigenvalue of
1
2
(
∂φ(x)
∂x
+
(
∂φ(x)
∂x
)>)
where the Jacobian of the non-
linear function is evaluated at the ith sampled point. Finally,
ρ is computed by finding the maximum value of β(·) over D.
To compute the quadratic inner-boundedness constants µ
and ϕ, a similar algorithm can be obtained. In particular,
instead of sampling over individual xi ∈ D, two state-space
samples xi and xj can be sampled at each iteration (i, j), and(
φ(xi)− φ(xj)
)>(
φ(xi)− φ(xj)
) ≤ µi,j ‖xi − xj‖2
+ϕi,j 〈φ(xi)− φ(xj),xi − xj〉,
is evaluated iteratively for all possible permutations xi and xj
in D to obtain the maximum values for µ and ϕ that satisfy
the above inequality.
Following these assumptions, the dynamics of this observer
can be written as
xˆ
.
= Axˆ + Bu + φ(xˆ) + L
(
y −Cxˆ), (11)
6where L is a matrix gain determined by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Observer Design Algorithm
compute constants ρ, µ, and ϕ via an offline search algorithm
solve this LMI for 1, 2, σ > 0 and P = P>  O:
A>P+PA+ (1ρ+ 2µ)In
−σC>C P+ ϕ 2 − 1
2
In(
P+
ϕ 2 − 1
2
In
)>
−2In
 < 0. (12)
obtain the observer design gain matrix L:
L =
σ
2
P−1C>. (13)
simulate the observer design given in (11)
First, given the Lipschitz constants ρ, ϕ, and µ, the linear
matrix inequality in (12) is solved for positive constants
1, 2, and σ and a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix P.
Utilizing the L in (13), the state estimates generated from (11)
are guaranteed to converge to the actual values of the states.
Note that the observer design utilizes linearized measure-
ment functions C, which for power system DSE can be ob-
tained by linearizing the nonlinear functions in (7). However,
since the measurement functions have high nonlinearity, when
performing the estimation we do not use (11), as in [48], but
choose to directly use the nonlinear measurement functions as
Lxˆ
.
= Axˆ + Bu + φ(xˆ) + L
(
y − h(xˆ)). (14)
The observer presented here is designed to seamlessly deal
with model uncertainties. It assumes that the nonlinearities
present in the power system dynamics (i.e., φ(x)) satisfy
the quadratic inner-boundedness and the one-sided Lipschitz
condition. As we illustrate in the results, power systems in
fact satisfy these conditions (see [49]). Then any predicted
uncertainty in the model, in addition to unknown inputs, can
be added to the nonlinearity function φ(x). In addition to
this contribution, we emphasize that the numerical algorithms
given to find the constants ρ, ϕ, and µ can be used to any
nonlinear dynamic system since analytically computing these
constants is impractical for large-scale networks with a huge
number of nonlinearities.
The main idea behind the observer is to minimize the differ-
ence between the estimated measurements (i.e., yˆ(t)) and the
actual ones (y(t)) through the innovation term L
(
y− h(xˆ)).
The objective of this term is to nullify/minimize the discrep-
ancies due to errors in the estimation, model uncertainties,
measurement noise, or attack vectors. The difference between
y(t) and yˆ(t) yields an estimate for the attack vector. Hence,
the states evolution for the observer are indirectly aware of the
differences between measured and potentially corrupt outputs
and the estimated ones. Given the solution to the LMIs,
the estimation error dynamics will be asymptotically stable,
which implies that even under attack vectors, the observer
will succeed in providing converging state estimates. Finally,
it is important to mention that Algorithm 2 can be performed
offline, which implies that the observer in real-time only
requires a state-estimate update while all other quantities are
given; after finding L one can simulate (14) without needing
to perform other computations.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we test EKF, UKF, SR-UKF, CKF, and the nonlinear
observer on the 16-machine 68-bus system extracted from
Power System Toolbox (PST) [52]. For the DSE we consider
both unknown inputs to the system dynamics and cyber attacks
against the measurements including data integrity, DoS, and
replay attacks; see Section III. All tests are performed on a
3.2-GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790S desktop.
For simulating the power system to mimic the real system
dynamics, we model an IEEE Type DC1 excitation system
and a simplified turbine-governor system, which leads to a
10th order generator model. More details about the model can
be found in [38]. The simulation data is generated as follows.
1) The simulation data is generated by the detailed 10-th
order model. The sampling rate is 60 samples/s.
2) In order to generate dynamic response, a three-phase
fault is applied at bus 6 of branch 6− 11 and is cleared
at the near and remote ends after 0.05 and 0.1 s.
3) All generators are equipped with PMUs at their terminal
buses. The real and imaginary parts of the voltage phasor
and current phasor are considered as measurements.
4) The sampling rate of the measurements is set to be 60
frames/s to mimic the PMU sampling rate.
5) Gaussian process noise is added and the process noice
covariance is a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal entries
are the square of 5% of the largest state changes [30].
6) Gaussian noise with variance 0.012 is added to the PMU
measurements.
7) Each entry of the unknown input coefficients Bw is a
random number that follows normal distribution with
zero mean and variance as the square of 50% of the
largest state changes. Note that the variance here is much
bigger than that of the process noise.
8) The unknown input vector w is set as a function of t as
w(t) =

0.5 cos(ωut)
0.5 sin(ωut)
0.5 cos(ωut)
0.5 sin(ωut)
−e−5t
0.2 e−t cos(ωut)
0.2 cos(ωut)
0.1 sin(ωut)

,
where ωu = 100 is the frequency of the given signals.
The unknown inputs are manually chosen, showing
different scenarios for inaccurate model and parameters
without a predetermined distribution.
For DSE we use the fourth-order generator model in [28],
[29]. We do not use a more detailed model mainly because
1) A good model should be simple enough to facilitate design
[5], 2) it is harder to validate a more detailed model and there
are also more parameters that need to be calibrated [6], [7],
and 3) the computational burden can be higher for a more
detailed model, which may not satisfy the requirement of real-
time estimation. The Kalman filters and the observer are set
as follows.
71) DSE is performed on the post-contingency system on
time period [0, 10 s], which starts from the fault clearing.
2) The initial estimated mean of the rotor speed is set to
be ω0 and that for the other states is set to be twice of
the real initial states.
3) The initial estimation error covariance is set to be 0.1In.
4) As mentioned before, the covariance of the process noise
is set as a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal entries are
the square of 5% of the largest state changes [30].
5) The covariance for the measurement noise is a diagonal
matrix, whose diagonal entries are 0.012, as in [30].
6) For both UKF and SR-UKF, 2n + 1 sigma points are
used in the unscented transformation.
7) For UKF and SR-UKF, a popular heuristic n + κ =
3 proposed in [53] is used to choose the parameter κ
in unscented transformation in order to minimize the
moments of the standard Gaussian and the sigma points
up to the fourth order.
8) For UKF is performed by using the EKF/UKF toolbox
[54], in which the function ‘schol’ is used to calculate
the lower triangular Cholesky factor of a matrix and
can get an output even when the matrix is not positive
semidefinite [29].
9) For the observer in Section V, the LMI (12) is solved
via CVX on MATLAB [55]. The Lipschitz constants in
Algorithm 2 are set as ρ = 10, µ = 1, and ϕ = 1.
10) The mechanical torque and internal field voltage are
considered as unavailable inputs and take steady-state
values, because they are difficult to measure [21], [25].
11) On [0, 1 s] the reduced admittance matrix is the one for
the pre-contingency state.
12) Data integrity, DoS, and replay attacks, as discussed in
Section III-B, are added to the PMU measurements.
A. Scenario 1: Data Integrity Attack
Data integrity attack is added to the first eight mea-
surements, i.e., the real parts of the voltage phasors. The
compromised measurements are obtained by scaling the real
measurements by 0.6 and 1/0.6, respectively, for the first
four and the last four measurements. The 2-norm of the
relative error of the states, ||(x(t)−xˆ(t))/x(t)||2, for different
estimation methods is shown in Fig. 1. It is seen that the error
norm for both CKF and the observer can quickly converge
among which the observer converges faster, while the value
that CKF converges to is slightly smaller in magnitude. By
contrast, EKF, UKF, and SR-UKF do not perform as well.
We also show the states estimation for Generator 1 in Fig.
2. It is seen that the observer and CKF converge rapidly while
the EKF fails to converge after 10 seconds. The estimation for
UKF is separately shown in Fig. 3 because its estimated states
are far away from the real states. Note that the real system
dynamics are stable while the UKF estimation misled by the
data integrity attack indicates that the system is unstable.
The real, compromised, and estimated values for the first
measurement are shown in Fig. 4. For the observer, CKF, and
SR-UKF, the estimated measurements are very close to the
actual ones. For EKF there are some differences between the
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Fig. 1. Norm of relative error of the states in Scenario 1.
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Fig. 4. Estimated values for the first measurement in Scenario 1.
estimates and the real values, while UKF’s generated estimates
are close to the compromised measurements, indicating that it
is completely misled by the cyber attack.
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Fig. 5. Norm of relative error of the states. (a) Scenario 2. (b) Scenario 3.
B. Scenario 2: DoS Attack and Scenario 3: Replay Attack
The first eight measurements are kept unchanged for t ∈
[3 s, 6 s] to mimic the DoS attack in which case the updated
measurements cannot be sent to the control center due to, for
example, jammed communication between PMU to PDC or
between PDC to the control center [42].
Replay attack is added on the first eight measurements for
which there is yi(t) = yi(t− 3) for t ∈ [3 s, 6 s].
The 2-norm of the relative error of the states is shown in
Fig. 5 and the results are very similar to those in Scenario 1.
C. Discussion on Model Uncertainty Estimation
We take Scenario 1 as an example to discuss the perfor-
mance of different methods in dealing with model uncertainty.
The states of the system with and without model uncertainty,
including unknown inputs, unavailable inputs, and parameter
inaccuracy, are separately denoted by x and x0, which are
shown in Fig. 6. The difference between x and x0, x − x0,
is shown in Fig. 7. The estimated model uncertainty for
Generator 1 by EKF, SR-UKF, CKF, and the observer is shown
in Fig. 8 and that for UKF is shown in Fig. 9. It is seen
that SR-UKF, CKF, and the observer can estimate the model
uncertainty pretty well while the EKF does not perform as well
and the UKF has the worst performance for which the model
uncertainty estimation is largely misled by the data integrity
attack.
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D. Discussion on Cyber Attack Detection
The normalized innovation ratio of the jth measurement at
time step k is defined as the ratio between the deviation of its
actual measurement from the predicted measurement and the
expected standard deviation [22], [24], [25]:
λk,j =
yk,j − yˆk|k−1,j√
Pyy,k|k−1,j
, (15)
where Pyy,k|k−1,j is the jth diagonal element of the measure-
ment covariance.
The normalized innovation ratio for all of the measurements
for EKF, UKF, SR-UKF, and CKF in Scenario 1 are shown
in Fig. 10. It is seen that for EKF and UKF the normalized
innovation ratios of a few uncompromised measurements
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Fig. 10. Cyber attack detection in Scenario 1 for (a) EKF, (b) UKF, (c)
SR-UKF, and (d) CKF.
are greater than those for the compromised measurements,
which means that EKF and UKF cannot correctly detect the
compromised measurements. For SR-UKF and CKF, after
a few seconds (in the first second some uncompromised
measurements can have bigger normalized innovation ratios
mainly because the parameters used for estimation in that
time period are inaccurate), the normalized innovation ratios
for compromised measurements are significantly greater than
those for the uncompromised ones, and the compromised
measurements can be detected by a properly chosen threshold.
Compared to SR-UKF, CKF has a better performance. For
Scenarios 2–3 the results are similar and are not presented.
For the observer, since there is no measurement covariance
we will detect cyber attacks against the measurements directly
using the measurement innovation yk,j − yˆk|k−1,j , which is
shown in Fig. 11a for Scenario 1. It is seen that after the
first second in which the parameters are inaccurate the mea-
surement innovation of the compromised measurements are
significantly greater than those of the uncompromised ones and
thus the compromised measurements can be easily detected.
In Fig. 11b we also show the different between the real and
estimated measurements, y0−yˆ. For both the compromised and
uncompromised measurements, the estimated measurements
from the observer can almost immediately converge to the
real measurements after the first second.
In Fig. 12 we show the measurement innovation of the
observer for Scenario 2 (Fig. 12a) and Scenario 3 (Fig. 12b),
which indicates that the compromised measurements can also
be detected by the observer.
E. Non-Gaussian Measurement Noise
We performed DSE under data integrity attack in Scenario 1
with non-Gaussian measurement noise, including the Laplace
noise and Cauchy noise.
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Laplace noise with mean m and scale s is generated by
rLaplace = m− s sgn(U1) ln(1− 2|U1|), (16)
where m is set to be zero, s is chosen as 0.02, and U1 is a
random number sampled from a uniform distribution in the
interval (−0.5, 0.5].
Cauchy noise is obtained by sampling the inverse cumula-
tive distribution function of the distribution
rCauchy = a+ b tan
(
pi(U2 − 0.5)
)
, (17)
where a = 0 and b = 10−4 are the location and scale
parameters, and U2 is randomly sampled from the uniform
distribution on the interval (0, 1).
The norms of the relative error of the states under Laplace
and Cauchy noises are shown in Fig. 13. Similar to the case
with Gaussian noise, the observer and CKF also outperform
the other methods. Under Laplace noise, the performance of
different methods are similar to that under Gaussian noise.
However, under Cauchy noise that has a super-heavy tailed
distribution with no defined moments, the performance of all
methods degrade, converging to a much bigger norm of relative
error of the states.
F. Computational Efficiency
For the above three scenarios, the time for estimation by
different methods is listed in Table I. It is seen that EKF and
the observer are more efficient than the other methods while
CKF is the least efficient. Note that the time reported here is
from MATLAB implementations. It can be greatly reduced by
more efficient, such as C-based implementations.
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Fig. 13. Norm of relative error of the states under different measurement
noises. (a) Laplace noise and (b) Cauchy noise.
TABLE I
TIME FOR PERFORMING ESTIMATION FOR 10 SECONDS
EKF UKF SR-UKF CKF observer
4.0 s 11.2 s 11.6 s 9.9 s 5.8 s
VII. COMPARING KALMAN FILTERS AND OBSERVERS
Here, various functionalities of DSE methods and their
strengths and weaknesses relative to each functionality are
presented based on (a) the technical, theoretical capabilities
and (b) experimental results in Section VI.
• Nonlinearities in Dynamics: UKF, SR-UKF, CKF, and
the observer in Section V all work on nonlinear systems
while EKF assumes linearized system dynamics. Besides,
the presented observer uses linearized measurement func-
tions for design but directly uses nonlinear measurement
functions for estimation.
• Solution Feasibility: The main principle that governs the
design of most observers is based on finding a matrix
gain satisfying a certain condition, such as a solution to
a matrix inequality. The state estimates are guaranteed
to converge to the actual ones if a solution to the LMI
exists. In contrast, KF methods do not require that.
• Unknown Initial Conditions: Most observer designs are
independent on the knowledge of the initial conditions of
the system. However, if the estimator’s initial condition
is chosen to be reasonably different from the actual one,
estimates from KF might not converge to the actual ones.
• Robustness to Model Uncertainty and Cyber Attacks: The
observer in Section V and the CKF outperforms UKF
(SR-UKF) and EKF in the state estimation under model
uncertainty and attack vectors. The observer is robust
to model uncertainties because it only assumes that the
nonlinearities in the power system dynamics (i.e., φ(x))
satisfy the quadratic inner-boundedness and the one-sided
Lipschitz condition. As in Section IV-C, CKF is more
robust mostly due to its more accurate cubature approach,
which, however, requires more careful investigation.
• Tolerance to Process and Measurement Noise: The ob-
server in Section V is tolerant to measurement and pro-
cess noise similar to those assumed for KFs. By design,
the KF techniques are developed to deal with such noise.
• Convergence Guarantees: Observers have theoretical
guarantees for convergence while for the KF techniques
there is no strict proof to guarantee that the estimation
converges to actual states.
• Numerical Stability: Observers do not have numerical
stability problems while UKF can encounter numerical
instability because the estimation error covariance matrix
is not always guaranteed to be positive semi-definite [29].
• Tolerance to Parametric Inaccuracy: KF-based methods
can tolerate inaccurate parameters to some extent. Dy-
namic observers deal with parametric uncertainty in the
sense that all uncertainties can be augmented to the
unknown input component in the state dynamics (Bww).
• Computational Complexity: The CKF, UKF (SR-UKF),
and EKF all have computational complexity of O(n3)
[16], [27]. Since the observers’ matrix gains are obtained
offline by solving LMIs, observers are easier to imple-
ment as only the dynamics are needed in the estimation.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we discuss different DSE methods by pre-
senting an overview of state-of-the-art estimation techniques
and developing alternatives, including the CKF and dynamic
observers, to address major limitations of existing methods
such as intolerance to inaccurate system model and malicious
cyber attacks. The proposed methods are extensively tested
on a 16-machine 68-bus power system, under significant
model uncertainty and cyber attacks against the synchrophaosr
measurements. It is shown that the CKF and the observer are
more robust to model uncertainty and cyber attacks.
Based on the theoretical capabilities and the experimental
results, we summarize the strengths and weaknesses of differ-
ent estimation techniques especially for power system DSE.
We acknowledge that some of these comparisons, such as
tolerance to process and measurement noise, are mostly based
on numerical results. As future work we will more theoreti-
cally investigate and analyze the observer in comparison with
Kalman filters.
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